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Abstract
This note clarifies aome of the entry deterrence aspects of capital
accumulation. Since accumulating capital takes time the focus of this note
is on the importance of time in the analysis of entry deterrence. While the
post-entry game is modelled as a capital accumulation differential game For
which we solve for the feedback equilibrium, we also add a time dimension to
the pre-entry game assuming that the entry decision ia subject to entry pre-
paration that also takes time. This preparation period affects the analysis
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1. Introduction
In his seminal work on the supply side of new markets Spence (1977,
1979) analyses the strategic interaction of early entrants in their game
with potential entrants. The result is in spirit similar to the von Stackel-
berg oligopoly model but the strategic asymmetries are now induced by the
history of the market. The crucial point is that the incumbents can make
irrevocable investments in product-specific capital which deter entry or
which lead to a favourable position on the market after new entries. In the
terminology of Schelling (1960) these investments are an advence commitment
or credible threat. Commitmenta to future investments are ruled out, because
these commitments are not credible and because otherwise the fundamental
asymmetry between established firms and potential entrents disappears. Dixit
(1980) argues that this also means that an excess capacity strategy cannot
be sustained. After entry a Cournot~Nash game will be played between all the
firms in the market. Dixit stresses in his paper that it is important to
distinguish a pre-entry stage and a post-entry stage. Although the rules of
the post-entry game are exogenous (such as a Cournot~Nash oligopoly), the
established firm can influence the outcome of that game to its advantage by
building favourable initíal conditions in the pre-entry stage. Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983) analyse the post-entry game in continuous time with an infi-
nite horizon. They decive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for invest-
ment strategies which are only a function of the state (that is the current
capital stocks). By first allowing the firms to coordinate their strategies
and by then invoking some ad hoc argument they can reduce the set of perfect
equilibria to one. This is necessary to be able to discuss entry deterrence.
Reynolds (1987) derives the subgame-perfect (or feedback Nash) equilibrium
for the game in which investments are reversible but capacity is subject to
adjustment coats. This equilibrium ia unique. Reynolds compares it with the
open-loop Nash equilibrium in which the investment strategies are only a
function of time.
In this note the post-entry game is modelled as the capital accumula-
tion geme in Reynolds' paper. However, since investment commitmenta in ad-
vance of actual investments are not credible, the feedback Nash or subgame-
perfect Markov equilibrium ia in our view the only reasonable solution3
concept. In Dixit's terminology the rules of the post-entry game lead to the
feedback Nash equilibrium. The values of this game are a function of the
initiel capacity levels. Suppose there is one incumbent and one potentisl
entrant. At the start of the post-entry game the capacity level of the
entrant ia zero and the capacity level of the incumbent dependa on its
investments before entry. The novelty in this note ia to model explicitly a
time-lag between the potential entrant's preliminary decision to enter and
the actual entry to the market. The incumbent can use thia period to invest
in extra capacity in order to deter entry or to achieve e good starting
position for the post-entry game. When the investment costs are convex, the
length of the time-lag pla,ys a crucial role in the decision problem of the
incumbent. A second novelty in this note is the introduction of preparation
costs for the potential entrant. It is shown that this gives the incumbent
firm the possibility to realize monopoly profits in the pre-entry stage,
even if it is not a natural monopoly but an artificial monopoly in the
terminology of Eaton end Lipsey (1981). It is therefore better to apeak in
this case of a natural monopoly end a strategic natural monopoly.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the framework of the
analysis. In section 3 and the appendix the equilibrium of the post-entry
capital accumulation differential game is derived. Section 4 analyses the
pre-entry decision problem of the incumbent firm. In section 5 a stretegic
natural monopoly is introduced es a consequence of small but non-zero pre-
paration costs and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The framework
Consider an industry in which there is one incumbent firm and one po-
tential entrant. It is assumed that entry cannot be decided upon and carried
out instantaneously. The lag between the entry decision and the actual entry
is denoted by the preparation time te ) 0. Moreover, the entry decision is
not a commitment. A firm can reconsider this decision at the last moment
before the preparatíon time has elapsed. Considering entry is not necessa-
rily costless and we denote this cost as fe x 0. Clearly, if fe - 0, the po-
tential entrant will ennounce its intention right awey end leave the actual4
entry decision to time te or later. We atart our analysis by considering the
case of zero preparation costs. In section 5 we consider the case in which
the potential entrant has to bear some preparation costs.
Both firms in our model accumulate some form of capital according to
the standard capital accumulation dynamics
Ki(t) s Ii(t) - bKi(t), Ki(0) s KiO, i~ 1,2, (1)
where Ki denotea the capital level, Ii the inveatment level and b is a
common depreciation factor. The entrant can atart to accumulate capital only
after it enters. There is no capital accumulation
period. Investment is costly end we let Ci(Ii) be the
ia a convex and increasing function.
We assume that the instantaneous profits at time
a function of the state variablea [K1(t),K2(t)]. Thia
firms do not compete through pricea or quantities but
during the preparation
cost of ínvestment. Ci
t cen be expreased as
is not to say that the
that a reduced form
can be used. It is assumed that the profit function R1(K1(t),K2(t)) is an
increasing and concave function of Ki end a decreasing function of K~, i-
1,2, j f i. The objective of each firm is to maximize its discounted stream
of profits net of investment costs




where r is the common discount rate, subject to the capital accumulation
dynamics (1).
Entry is associated with some fixed (sunk) cost of entry, denoted by
Fe. That is fe is paid at the beginning of the preparation period while Fe
is paid et the time of the entry itself. Clearly, the potential entrent will
enter the market, if, at the moment of entry, the discounted atream of pro-
fits net of inveatment costs at least covers the entry fee Fe. The post-
entry game is described by (1)-(2), starting at time te. This can be called
a capital accumulation differential game (see, e.g., Fershtman and Muller
(1984) and Reynolds (198~)). Suppose that the incumbent firm is denoted es5
firm 1 and the entrant firm as firm 2. On the assumption that prior to entry
the entrant dces not accumulate capital, the initial condition of the capi-
tal accumulation game is [K1(te),O]. If the value functions V1 of the post-
entry game exíst, the potential entrent will choose to enter at time te only
if
VZ(K1(t).0) - Fe ) 0. (3)
This implies that if the incumbent firm achieves at time te at least the
capital level
Kd(Fe) :- inf {K1~V2(K1,0) - Fe 5 0} (4)
entry is blocked. Therefore we define Kd(Fa) as the capital deterrence le-
vel.
An incumbent firm may ignore the possibility of entry. This firm maximizes
(2) subject to (1) with KZ always equal to 0. Ne denote the optimal capital
accumulation path of this firm as Km(.).
Definition 1: M incumbent fírm will be called a natural monopoly, if
Km(t) 2 Kd(Fe) for every t 2 te. (5)
Note that the position of a firm as a natural monopoly depends on both the
entry cost FQ and the length of the preparation period te.
Given the deterrence level Kd(Fe), the incumbent firm is facing a standard
entry deterrence problem. The firm can accumulate capital up to Kd(Fe) and
block entry, or it can accommodate entry. Since the investment costs are
convex, the decision of the incumbent depends on the time it hes to reach
the deterrence level. The shorter the preparation time te is the more costly
it will be to reach Kd(Fe). Moreover, the incumbent's decision problem is
not just whether to deter entry or to accommodate entry. Even if this firm
decides to accommodate, it is of importance which capital level it reaches
by time te as this level affects its profits in the post-entry game.6
3. The post-entry game: capital accumulation game
As was already stated in section 2, after entry the two firms are enga-
ged in a capital accumulation differential geme. Because in the general case
such a game is not analytically tractable, a linear-quadratic structure is
adopted here. The cost functions are given by
C(Ii) -} cIi, c) 0, i- 1,2
and the profit functions are given by
ITi(Ki.K~) ' Ki(a - Ki - K~). i.j ' 1.2, i~ j.
It follows that the firms try to maximize
(6)
(7)
J{Ki(t)(a - Ki(t) - Kf(t)) -~ cIi(t)} e'rt dt i,~ - 1.2. i~~. (8)
0
subject to (1), where the initiel time is taken to be 0 in order to simplify
notation, although the actuel initial time is te.
The capital accumulation differential game (8)-(1) ia identical to the one
in Reynolds (1987). Furthermore, the game is in structure very similar to
the dynamic duopoly with sticky prices (Fershtman end Kamien, 198~) and to a
model of competitive arms accumulation (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1990).
Because it seems reasonable to assume that the firms can condition their
investments on the current capital levels and that the firms can not commit
themselves to future investments, the feedback Nash (Starr and Ho, 1969) or
subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium has to be derived. The outcome can be
found in Reynolds (1987), but the appendix of this paper presents this
outcome and the derivation in a much more transparent way.
The capital accumulation game can therefore be summarized by a value func-
tion Vi(K1,K2), which is continuous in its arguments with ~Vi~~l{i ~ 0 and~Vi~dlCj ( 0, i~ j, and which gives the value for player i of the capital
accumulation game that starts with the initial condition (K1,K2).
4. The incumbent decision problem
At date t- 0 the incumbent has to decide whether to follow a capital
accumulation path that prevents entry or a path that accommodatea entry. The
incumbent has to compare its profits given by Lhe outcome of problem 1, when
entry is accommodated, and its profits given by the outcome of problem 2,
when entry is deterred.
Problem 1: Accommodating Entry
te
maximize f (K1(t)(a - K1(t)) -} cIi(t)} e rt dt t V1(K1(te),O) e-rte,(9)
I1(.) 0
subject to (1), K1(0) - K10 and K1(te) C Kd(Fe).
The trade-off for the incumbent in problem 1 is to realize monopoly profits
in the pre-entry stage, on the one hand, and to reach a favourable initial
position in the post-entry stage, on the other hand.
Problem 2: Deterring Entry
maximize f{K1(t)(a - K1(t)) -} cIi(t)} e-rt dt, (10)
I1(') JO
subject to (1), K1(0) - K10 and K1(t) 2 Kd(FQ) for every t 2 te.
When the last constraint is not binding, problem 2 corresponds to a natural
monopoly as defined in definition 1. Otherwise, the incumbent ia sometimes
called an artificisl monopoly.8
Let Va(K10,te,Kd(Fe)) be the value of the control problem for the
incumbent when entry is accommodated (problem 1) and Vd(K10,te,Kd(Fe)) be
the value when the incumbent chooses to deter entry (problem 2). Clearly,
the incumbent will deter entry iff Vd(K10,te,Kd(Fe)) ) Va(K10,te,Kd(Fe))
Although we choose not to provide specific solutions to problems 1 and 2, we
argue that both Va(.) and Vd(.) increase with te. There are two reasons for
this. Firstly, a higher te implies that the incumbent can enjoy a longer
monopolistic period. Secondly, the incumbent now has more time either to
achieve a favourable starting position for the post-entry game in case it
chooses to accommodate entry, or to achieve the capital deterrence level Kd.
Since the accumulation costs are convex, reaching these levels is less cost-
ly when there is more time. Clearly, the effects of changing te in Va(.) end
Vd(.) are not identical. Therefore, it is possible that for a given pair
(t ,Kd(Fo)) the incumbent will chooae to deter entry WhorcnH for a shorter
preparation period, i.e. te C te, the optimal strategy is to accommodate
entry. This happens when the extra investment costs to reach the capital
deterrence level Kd(Fe) in e shorter period te outweigh the losses that are





We can conclude that the length of the preparation period is an important
factor in determining whether the incumbent's optimal strategy is to deter
entry or not. In particular we expect that the set of posaible pairs (te,Fe)
will be divided as in Figure 1, such that for (te,Fe) E A entry is deterred
whereas for (te,Fe) ([ A entry is accommodated.9
Intuitively, for a high Fe the level of deterrence capital Kd is low
and thus the incumbent only needs a short preparation period to accumulate
this level. Reducing Fe leads to a higher Kd, which implies that the incum-
bent will only accumulate this level if the preparation period is suffi-
ciently long. The area A covers both the situationa that correspond to a
natural monopoly and to an artificial monopoly.
Likewise, whether the incumbent firm is a natural monopoly or not also
depends on the length of the preparation period te. It can very well be that
Km(t) x Kd(Fe), t 2 te, which implies that the incumbent firm is a natural
monopoly for the preparation period te, whereas Km(te) t Kd(Fe) holds for a
shorter preparation period te C te, which implies that in that case the
incumbent firm is not a natural monopoly.
5. The strategic natural monopoly
The standard definition of natural monopoly describes the case where a
firm, by acting as a monopolist that maximizes profits, while ignoring the
possibility of entry, in fact deters entry. That is the profit maximizing
capital accumulation path Km(.) lies on or above the capital deterrence
level Kd(Fe) from time te onwards, so that entry is automatically deterred.
Consider now the case in which the preparation costs fe - E ) 0, and
suppose that the incumbent firm is not a natural monopolist. The question is
whether the potential entrant will announce entry in such a case and thus
pay fe ) 0. The answer depends on what the potential entrant expects the
incumbent's reaction to be to an entry announcement. If the announcement is
done at time t- 0 and if Vd(K10,te,Kd(Fe)) ) Va(K10,te,Kd(Fe)), then the
incumbent will react to such an announcement by accumulating the capital
deterrence level Kd(Fe) by Lime te, so that entry ia deterred. Given such a
reaction the optimal strategy of the potentisl entrant is not to start the
preparations for entry at all end thus to avoid the costs fe ) 0. The only
subgame perfect equilibrium in this case is that the incumbent firm acts as
a monopolist, accumulating capital according to Km(.). That ia not to say
that the incumbent firm ignores the possibility of entry. Since there ís a
preparation period te, the incumbent realizea that if necessary once entry10
will be announced it can start to accumulate capital to the level Kd(Fe) in
order to deter entry. Moreover, since preparation to enter is not costless
and entry will be deterred, the potential entrant will not start to prepare
for entry, and the incumbent can make monopoly profits all the way.
This analysis implies that in the case of non-zero preparation costs
the incumbent firm's capital accumulation path follows the path Km(.), even
if the íncumbent firm is not a natural monopoly. We denote such a market as
a strateQic natural monovoly (SNM). The part of the area A in Figure 1, that
corresponds to an artificisl monopoly in the case of zero preparation costs,
now becomes the area of a strategíc natural monopoly with monopoly profíts
for the incumbent firm at all times. Clearly, the position of a firm as a
SNM depends again on both the entry cost Fe and the length of the prepara-
tion period te.
6. Conclusion
The role of capital in entry deterrence is well documented in the lite-
rature. The standard setting for such an analysis has been a two-stage game
where in the first stage capital is built, usually with linear costs.
In this note we claim that the pre-entry stage should also be modelled
with a specific attention to the role of time. Under the standard assumption
of convex investment costs the length of the pre-entry period proves to be
an important factor in the analysis of entry deterrence. Furthermore, it is
shown that in the case of non-zero preparation costs the artificial monopoly
can in fact realize monopoly profits in the pre-entry stage because of its
credible threat to accumulate extra capitsl in order to deter entry end to
burden the potential entrent with these preparation costs when it starta to
prepare for entry.
These observations may lead to a more detailed analysis of the entry
deterrence problem in which the preparation period can also be one of the
firm's strategic variables. This analysis is, however, beyond the scope of
this note and will be subject of further research.11
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Appendix
Consider the differential game (i - 1,2)
maximise r{-} cIi(t) t} x'(t)Qix(t) f qix(t)}e-rt dt (A.1)
Ii(.) J~
subject to z(t) - Ax(t) t B1I1(t) t B2I2(t), x(0) - x~, (A.2)
where the state x consists of the capital stocks [K1,K2]', and where




The value functions are denoted as V. The feedback Nash equilibrium for this
differential game results from the dynamic programming equations (i - 1,2)
rVi(x) - max {-} cIi a} x'Qix 4 qix t Vix(x)(Ax 4 Blul 4 B2u2)}. (A.3)
The equilibrium strategies are given by
Ii(x) - (l~c)BiVix(x). (A.4)
The dynamic programming equations become (i,j - 1,2; i~ j)
rVi(x) - -} (l~c)Vix(x)BiBiVix(x) . } x'Qix . qix t
vixl.x)(Ax ~ (l~c)BiBivix(x) . (l~c)BjB~Vjx(x))}. (A.5?
With the quadratic value functions
V1(x) -} x' pl p3l x..... ; V2(x) ' } x' f p2 p3l x. .... (A.6)
3 2J L 3 1J13
equation of the quadratic terms of (A.5) yields the system of equations
P1 t 2p3 -(2btr)cpl - 2c - o, (A.7)
2P1P3 ' P3P2 - Í 2b~r)cP3 - c - , (A.8)
P3 t 2p1P2 - (2b'r)cp2 - o. (A.9)
When the equilibrium strategies of (A.4) are substituted in the system (A.2)
the closed-loop system results with the state-transition matrix
Acl S~P1Ic p3~c
'- - P3Ic -bfpl~c)' (a.1o)
The eigenvalues of Acl are -b i pl~c : p3~c, ao that the closed-loop aystem
is stable if and only if
pl t p3 - bc ~ o and Pl - P3 - bc ~ o. (A.11)
Equation (A.7) describes an ellipse in the (pl,p3)-plane. Flirthermore, for
each value of p2 equation (A.8) describes a hyperbola in the (p p)-plane
and equation (A.9) a parabola. Definin
1~ 3
g p:- J(2c .}(2b.r)2c2), the use of
polar coordinates
P1 - } (2b'r)c , p sin 9; P3 - ~J2 p cos ~. -n ~ ~ s n. (A.12)
and the elimination of p2 leads to the equation
p2 cos3 ~o - 8p2 sin2 p cos p. 4J2 c sin p s 0.
Defining a :- J2 p2~c - 2,~2 .},~2 (2b,r)2c, (A.13) yields eventuslly
(A.13)
tan3 y~ - a tan2 ~ . tan ~ . (1~8)a - o. (A.14)14
Consider the function f given by
f(Y) .' y3 - aY2 t Y f(1~8)a, a 2 2J2. (A.15)
Some straightforward calculus shows that the function f has one negative
root y~ and two positive roots y2 and y3 with }J2 C y2 C y3. Consider y2 as
a t'unction of a. It is easy to see that y2(a) -},I2 for a - 2,~2. Implicit
differentiation yields
yz(a) - Cyz(a) - (1~8)]If~(Y2(a)) C 0. (A.16)
It follows that the smallest positive root y2 of the function f satisfies
},~2 C y2 C},~2. Since f(-},~2) C 0, the negative root yl of the function f
satisfies yl ) -},I2.
The largest positive root y3 of the function f is given by
Y3(a) - 2,I{(a2~9) - (ll3)} cos (w~3) ~ (a~3).
where
(A.17)
v - arccos [(a3~27) - (11a~48)]ILJ{(a219) - (1~3))]3. 0 ~ y ( (nl2).
Claim
The largest posítive root y3 of the function f satisfies the stability
constraints (A.il), but the negative root yl and the smallest positive root
y2 of the function f do not satisfy the stability constraints (A.11).
Proof
With the polar coordinates (A.12) the stability constraints (A.11) are given
by-n ~pCOand
~tan ~I )(}J2 z.} rc]~z with z ) 0 given by z2 a(},~2 z .} rc)2 - p2.
It follows that the stability constraints are given by
~tan ~~ ) L2a t rJl3J2 ac - r2c2)]~[2,I2 a- r2c]. (A.18)15
Because
~tan p~ -[2a t rJ(3J2 ac - r2c2)]IL8 i 4bc(ó~r)] ~
2a~[8 t 4bc(b~r)l ~ ~J2.
and because yl )-}J2 and }J2 ( y2 ~ }J2, these roots of the function f do
not satisfy the stability constrainta. FLrthermore,
Y3(a) ~ J{(a219) - (1~3)} ~ (a~3). (A.19)
The right-hand side of (A.19) is minimal for b- 0 and the right-hand side
of (A.18) is maximal for ó- 0. It is tedious but straightforward to show
that this minimal value is larger then this maximal value.
It follows that the largest positive root y3 of the function f satisfies the
stability constraints. Q.E.D.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the parameters pl and p3 of the
value functions are given by
P1 -~(2bir)c t J{L~J2 ac y3(a)]I[1 4 Y3(a)]}, (A.20)
P3 - J{[}J2 acll[1 ~ Y3(a)]}. (A.21)
where a- 2J2 .}J2 ( 2S.r)2c, and y3(a) is given by (A.17).
The parameter p2 of the value functions can then be calculated from (A.9),
which yields
P2 '-} J{L}J2 ac]~LY3(a) t Y3(a)]}. (A.22)
The linear terms of the quadratic value functions
vl(x) - .... f [Py P5]x . .... . v2(x) ' .... 4 [P5 P4]x ; .... (A.6)
can be found by equation of the linear terms of (A.5), which yields the
simple system of equations16
{P1 ~ P3 - (btr)c}p4 . p3p5 . a~ - p, (A.23)
(P2 . p3)p4 . {P1 - (bir)c}p5 - 0.
Finally, the equilibrium strategies become
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